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Abstract
Nationalization has defined American politics in recent years as voters
increasingly view state and local government through their national party loyalties. The
2010 midterm elections were intensely nationalized: Hundreds of races for the United
States House of Representatives focused on President Barack Obama’s agenda instead of
local issues. After election night, Republicans gained 63 seats in the US House, giving
them their largest majority since the 1940s. One of the political victims of the election
were members of the Blue Dog Coalition, a caucus of centrist, fiscally conservative
Democrats in Congress. Over half of the Blue Dogs lost re-election, including Stephanie
Herseth Sandlin of South Dakota and Harry Mitchell of Arizona’s 5th District. In
Congress: The Electoral Connection, congressional scholar David Mayhew outlines three
re-election strategies that members of Congress pursue: credit claiming, advertising, and
position taking. This thesis applies those three approaches to Sandlin and Mitchell’s races
to argue that nationalization may increasingly pose a threat to traditional, swing district
re-election strategies in the future; vulnerable incumbents may not be able to avoid
national controversy as the significance of local political issues recede in the minds of
American voters.
Key words: Nationalization; United States Congress; Blue Dog Coalition; 2010
Midterms
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Introduction: The Political Puzzle of Nationalization in Congress
During my freshman year at Claremont McKenna, I took Professor John Pitney’s
introduction to American government class during the 2018 midterm elections. In that
election, the Democrats took back the US House of Representatives. The results followed
historical trends where the incumbent party in the White House lost at least one chamber
of Congress. The 2018 midterms were also a referendum on former President Donald
Trump: voters disapproved of his administration and wanted a Democratic majority in the
US House to serve as a check on the executive. What I did not think about back then,
however, was how many voters went to the polls with mostly national political issues in
mind, such as the Trump Administration’s attempt to repeal the Affordable Care Act.1
Recently, nationalization—and its political and institutional consequences for
Congress—became a puzzle for me. A tweet from Professor Glassman prompted some
thinking about it as thesis topic2:

Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, among other young members of the US House of
Representatives, attract national media attention and raise a significant amount of money
from across the country. The nationally oriented US House member is a relatively new
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phenomenon: in the 1970s, many freshman members of Congress were primarily
concerned with acquiring power through committee positions and influencing public
policy.3 This shift in political incentives has important consequences for both the
individual Congress member and the institution. I am studying government during a time
where Congress is comprised of largely national political actors instead of locally focused
politicians. The US House of Representatives transformed from the Federalist Papers’
vision of responsive, constituent-focused representatives to Twitter media stars. This
nationalization of the US House led me to one election in particular: the 2010 midterms.
As I explain later, the 2010 midterm elections were widely considered a
nationalized election as Republican candidates ran against President Obama’s agenda.
The existing literature explores the role of the Tea Party in the midterms and situates the
electoral results in a larger history of election referendums on presidents. What was
missing from the literature, however, was an analysis that provides texture to these macro
political trends and nationalization. It became clear that I needed case studies to highlight
how exactly national political issues in 2010 affected the electoral behavior of members
of Congress. So, I looked to a caucus that would provide a contrast to nationalization: the
Blue Dog Coalition.
Blue Dog Democrats try to avoid controversial national political issues because
they all represent swing districts, or competitive electoral areas that are usually decided
within 5 percentage points in either partisan direction.4 As a result, independent voters
have a significant electoral impact on the result and swing district members try to adhere
to centrist positions. The Blue Dog Coalition, therefore, provides a nice juxtaposition to
nationalization and the partisan positions it creates. In 2010, over half of the Blue Dog
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caucus lost re-election, which followed historical data that demonstrates a decline in the
amount of swing districts since at least the 1992 election.5 In the 111th Congress of 20092010, 34 Democrats—most of whom were members of the Blue Dog Coalition—voted
against one of their party’s major policy priorities: the Affordable Care Act (ACA).6 Only
four of those members, however, were re-elected in 2010.7 One of the members who lost
was Representative Stephanie Sandlin, and she justified her vote by arguing that the bill,
in her words, “wasn’t right for South Dakota.”8 Sandlin approached re-election solely
focused on local district issues and throughout the campaign, distanced herself from
President Obama and national Democratic leadership. Despite her efforts, she still lost.
Sandlin’s race and Harry Mitchell’s in Tempe, Arizona are the two campaigns
that I analyze in this thesis. I picked those two because they differed in both district
representation and policy preferences. Mitchell’s district included the city of Tempe and
was mostly suburban. Sandlin’s at-large district was mostly rural and represented the
entire state. On policy, Mitchell voted for the ACA while Sandlin did not. The two
members’ campaigns are helpful as case studies because they represent a variance within
the Blue Dog Coalition but still highlight how nationalization shaped their political fates.
Of course, there are Blue Dogs who escaped the GOP’s nationalization strategy and won
in 2010. These members, however, were the exception rather than the rule.
I argue that swing district re-election strategies that the two Blue Dogs followed
in the 2010 midterms may be increasingly ineffective in the future where politics is
widely nationalized. I use a variety of primary sources, including press releases, debate
clips, advertisements, and legislation. I do not make any causal claims about the
relationship between the evidence and electoral outcomes. For example, I could not prove
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that Mitchell’s vote for the ACA cost him re-election. Rather, the value of this thesis is its
deepening of macro trends such as nationalization that are discussed broadly, but its
specific implications are lost. Now, when someone wonders what the political
consequences are of voters’ prioritization of the national over the local, they can refer to
the case studies in this thesis. It is also important, however, to acknowledge some
limitations of the work.
This thesis only evaluates two congressional races and therefore, I cannot draw
conclusions about how nationalization affected other Blue Dog Democrat campaigns in
2010. The two case studies are also isolated examples, and so a definitive claim about the
future of swing district representation is analytically flawed. The thesis does not make an
argument that the two races prove that certain swing district representation strategies will
fail in the future. Rather, the two case studies highlight certain electoral approaches that
Blue Dog Democrats share, such as fiscal conservative messaging and detachment from
the national party. The analysis of the campaign strategies raises questions about its
efficacy in swing districts, but it does not make correlative claims about those approaches
on electoral outcomes. The thesis is most useful as a supplement to more quantitative
studies, including one that found that voting against major Democratic policies was the
more effective re-election strategy for Democrats in Republican-leaning districts.9
This thesis takes the reader beyond the scholarly literature on nationalization and
illustrates how certain electoral trends shape the political strategies and policy choices of
individual members of Congress. Political science is full of theories that are sometimes
difficult to understand on a very practical level. I hope my analysis is useful to a wide
audience, from congressional scholars to voters who want to understand why their
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Congress members are more focused on the president and not their communities’ pot
holes.
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Chapter 1: The Nationalization of American Politics
National issues increasingly define American elections. Every election cycle,
more candidates from state legislatures to US Congress take positions on the incumbent
president’s agenda instead of sticking mostly to local district issues. Attack ads tie
incumbent members of Congress to their party leadership. Constituency issues take a
back seat to the national political landscape. The nationalization of politics is allconsuming and pervasive. As this thesis will explain, nationalization has shaped how
members of Congress pursue re-election. First, however, it is important to define
nationalization and its causes. This chapter will rely on Daniel Hopkins’s The
Increasingly United States and other scholars to do so.
Hopkins defines the two facets of nationalization: “The first is when the political
interest and issues dominant at the national level are reflected in subnational political
competition and behavior. The second is when political engagement is primarily oriented
nationally, to the exclusion of subnational governments [state and local] or political
affairs.”10 In other words, nationalization is present when the dominant national issues are
present in local politics, and voters are more concerned with national politics than their
state and local affairs. For example, many towns in Maine have announced that they are
Second Amendment sanctuary cities in response to President Biden’s inauguration and
gun control legislation in Congress.11 Hopkins’s definition of nationalization is very
useful for this thesis, especially how national political issues can dominate all levels of
government and geographies across the country.
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Nationalization and polarization are related but different concepts. Hopkins
writes: “Polarization is a process in which elected officials from two major political
parties adopt increasingly divergent policy positions, one that has heightened ideological
sorting and reduced partisan defections at the ballot box.”12 There are fewer and fewer
voters who vote cross-party. For example, in the current 117th Congress, there are only 16
House members who represent a district that voted for the opposing presidential
candidate.13 Of all the candidates in the 2020 general elections for the Senate, only Susan
Collins (R-ME) won in a state that went to the other party’s presidential candidate.
Nationalization, however, affects both political participation and knowledge,
“Nationalization is a multifaceted, mass-level process through which voters care less
about state and local politics and use the same criteria to pick candidates across the
federal system. When the parties adopt clear and divergent ideological positions, voters
may be increasingly likely to see state and local candidates through the lens of their
national loyalties.”14
One of Hopkins’s explanations of why political behavior has become nationalized
deals with political parties. He argues that political parties have nationalized vote choice
for citizens, “They [parties] simplify the task of voting by developing well-known
reputations that can help voters make informed choices without knowing much about
specific candidates. It stands to reason that a contemporary voter might not distinguish
between voting at the state and federal levels because the major parties no longer differ at
those levels to the extent that they used to.”15 In the 1950s and 1960s, it was common to
find conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans in Congress.16 The Obama
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Administration, however, found that there was rarely any policy agreement between
congressional Republicans and Democrats.17
Hopkins analyzes multiple facets of political parties to highlight the increased
nationalization trends, including the alignment of national and state party platforms,18
similar partisan identification across all levels of government,19 and the polarization of
state legislatures through roll call voting.20 A particularly illuminating piece of evidence
that Hopkins uses is an original 2014 survey that he commissioned that asked
respondents about their perceptions of state and national political parties.21 Hopkins
asked 251 respondents to evaluate one of the two major political parties in their state
while the other 250 respondents assessed one of the two national parties.22 Many of the
respondents who evaluated state level parties tied their performance to national politics,
such as this one respondent from North Carolina who said that the North Carolina GOP
was “not fighting Obama tactics enough.”23 He also points out that there is little
difference between the negative descriptions provided for the state and national parties.24
Specifically, 40 percent of respondents held negative views of their state Republican
parties while 41 percent did for the national Republican Party.25 Hopkins assembles a
wide range of evidence to make the case that both parties and voters have engaged with
politics at a national level.
Hopkins also argues that changes in the media market can explain nationalized
voting behavior and the decline in local civic participation.26 Cable news and social
media dominate American media consumption, and both mostly emphasize national
politics.27 The news sources do not have spatially bound viewers like print newspapers
do, so the nationalized content can reach anyone in the United States.28 Voters need
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information to mobilize for elections, and the civic information they are exposed to
centers around national issues.29
Media incentives also have a nationalizing effect on content. There has been a
recent consolidation of local television station ownership and local newspapers.30
Specifically, 12 companies owned 589 local television stations as of 2014 and the
companies had owned only 304 a decade earlier.31 From an economic perspective, the
owners have an incentive to focus on national news instead of local developments in
order to cut cost with regional stations.32 In the newspaper industry, newsrooms
employed 33,000 reporters in 2014 -- a 20,000 decrease from the mid-1990s.33 The cuts
in reporters include a decline in journalists who cover state politics, which may well
contribute to the decrease of voter knowledge in local issues.34 Hopkins also does an
analysis of the Chicago Tribune and Los Angeles Times to evaluate how the two
newspapers covered different levels of government from 1930-1989.35 He conducts a
word search analysis of “governor,” “mayor,” and “president,” in addition to a Latent
Dirichlet Allocation model that tracked how the two newspapers covered political topics
over time.36 The results find that national politics consistently attracts more media
attention than local government.37 A similar study conducted in 2012 found the same
conclusion: national politics commands the attention of media outlets at the expense of
state and local government.38 For this thesis, it is important to keep in mind that the
American voter’s political lens has national blinders and have increasingly neglected
state and local concerns.
Alternative explanations of nationalization are worth considering. Hopkins
discusses two: residential mobility and economic shifts.39 Increased residential mobility,
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or the populations that are born in one state, educated in another, and live in a third, are
probably not going to be knowledgeable about the politics of their home state.40 He posits
that the mobility of certain socio-economic groups could influence party nationalization,
such as if elites attend college outside of their home state, enter politics, and help form a
network of party staffers who do not have strong local political ties.41 Another study from
the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth and Young Adults found that Republican
affiliation was connected to a lower probability of rural to urban migration.42
Another possible explanation deals with certain economic changes. The rise of the
consumer economy, for example, means that Americans are exposed to the same brands
and their marketing.43 As a result, economic interest may not rely on one’s geographic
location and therefore national economic trends are more pertinent to Americans.44
Hopkins points to research by McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006) that demonstrated a
strong correlation between rising income inequality and polarization; income difference
leads to sharp policy disagreements among voters, which then map onto their
representatives.45 There is also evidence that suggests a direct relationship between
campaign finance law changes and polarization.46 Specifically, since 1990, candidates
have relied on individual and outside-district donors who are more likely to reflect
nationalized, ideological views than alternative sources.47
In “The (Re) Nationalization of Congressional Elections,” Morris Fiorina nicely
distills nationalization, “When elections are nationalized, people vote for the party, not
the person. Candidates of the party at different levels of government win and lose
together. Their fate is collective.”48 He points out that the recent nationalization of the
2006, 2010, and 2014 midterm elections was a return to the era between the mid-
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nineteenth century and early twentieth that had nationalized congressional election
patterns.49 Cross-party voting is a useful piece of evidence when evaluating
nationalization trends. Split-ticket majorities were rare in the late nineteenth century, but
increased quickly after World War II, leading to the 1972 and 1984 elections in which
almost half of congressional districts across the country split the ticket.50 In 1985, 114
Democratic members represented districts that President Ronald Reagan won.51 Fast
forward 28 years and only 16 Republicans in the US House in 2013 held districts that
President Barack Obama won.52 Fiorina provides evidence of a recent, clear trend around
the decline of candidate-based elections as cross-party voting decreases. Fiorina points
out that there is an agreement among political scientists that party sorting among voters
produces two ideologically different parties which can partly explain nationalization.53
This thesis will focus on the 2010 midterms and how its nationalized politics
affected members of Congress’s re-election behavior. In doing so, it will provide case
studies in how representatives electioneer in a world where their political fate is pinned to
their national party. It is helpful, however, to first understand the movement of
nationalization and its timeline in US elections.
Nationalization has had its ebbs and flows. Political scientist Larry Bartels looked
at presidential voting from 1868 to 1996 to examine the influence of partisanship, state,
and national-level factors to explain presidential election outcomes.54 He concluded that
state-level variables could explain presidential support patterns between the 1870s and
1920s, but then the state-level factors declined in influence between the 1920s and
1940s.55 His findings were consistent with the consensus that nationalization of elections
rose during the New Deal in the 1930s.56 Bartel demonstrated, however, that in the 1950s
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and 1960s, state-level factors became more influential in presidential election outcomes.57
Then, in the 1980s, Bartel found that nationalized behavior returned after President
Reagan’s election.58 The 1994 midterm was widely viewed as a nationalized election
when Republicans won 54 seats in the US House of Representatives during President
Clinton’s first term.59 The 1994 midterm election is a story that continued to unfold as the
2006, 2010, and 2014 midterms were all elections that were referendums on the sitting
president. 60 The Blue and Red waves that swept Congress then—and the nationalized
behavior of voters who came out to the polls—is the political context in which this thesis
is situated.
It is widely accepted by political scientists that the American electorate has
become more nationalized over the past century.61 The aim of this thesis, therefore, is not
to put forward an alternative explanation of nationalization; it will be accepted as a
premise that these explanations suffice and the electorate is nationalized. In this thesis,
nationalization is the political backdrop to explore an institution that originally intended
to best represent local interests. Now, members of the US House of Representatives are
almost inextricably linked to their national party leadership and agenda. Scholarly works,
such as Congress: The Electoral Connection by David Mayhew, have explored the
incentive structures of an earlier era of Congress. This thesis, using the 2010 midterms as
its focus, applies that work to provide insight into how nationalization has affected
members of Congress and their re-election strategies, especially Blue Dog Democrats. To
understand and draw conclusions about Congress in a nationalized age, one must first
understand how the institution has evolved. Congress: The Electoral Connection is a
great frame of reference to do that.
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Chapter 2: Advertising, Credit Claiming, and Position Taking in a
Modern Congress
David Mayhew’s Congress: The Electoral Connection (1974) is among the most
important congressional studies. Mayhew argues that a member of Congress has one goal
in mind: re-election.62 Mayhew works from the premise of re-election to evaluate how
that incentive drives their policy and political goals within the institution.63 The idea of
members as re-election seekers aligns with the three goals of a Congress member Richard
Fenno outlines: (1) getting re-elected, (2) achieving power in the legislative body, and (3)
making good public policy.64 Fenno coined the term “home style” in reference to how
members of Congress view their voters; a “home style” approach is district-focused in an
effort to gain their constituencies’ trust and get re-elected.65 Mayhew argues that
members engage in three central re-election activities: advertising, credit claiming, and
position taking.66 We need to update this explanation within the context of the modern
Congress-- which refers to the 2009-2012 period-- and the nationalization of politics.
According to Mayhew,, “[advertising is] … any effort to disseminate one’s name
among constituents in such a fashion as to create a favorable image but in messages
having little or no issue content.”67 The goal is to build a brand name for a member, most
often with an emphasis on experience, independence, concern, and knowledge.68 House
incumbents have an advantage in advertising because they visit the district regularly, give
speeches, and send out constituent newsletters.69 In the mid-1960s, political scientist
Walter Wilcox interviewed 158 members.70 Of those, 121 said that they sent constituent
newsletters on a regular basis; 48 wrote opinion columns in newspapers; 82 reached out
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to their constituents through the radio or TV; 89 Congress members sent mail
questionnaires.71
Credit claiming is the attempt to convince voters that the member of Congress is
responsible for a government policy action that helps the constituency.72 Members
usually take credit for government benefits for a geographic constituency and, in turn, the
voters repay the representative with their votes.73 Examples of the kinds of credit
claiming include constituent casework, earmarks, and legislation that benefits the
district.74 Mayhew writes:
The emphasis here is on individual accomplishment (rather, than, say, party or
governmental accomplishment) and on the congressman as doer (rather than, say,
expounder of constituency views). Credit claiming is highly important to
congressmen, with the consequence that much of congressional life is a relentless
search for opportunities to engage in it (53).

Credit claiming places the member of Congress at the center of the government benefits
for a district; the representative becomes the face of the pork barreling which gives them
political support during their re-election.
Position taking is the support of political issues in the interest voters.75 Mayhew
discusses how position taking is about rhetoric, not policy implementation, “The
congressman as position taker is a speaker rather than a doer. The electoral requirement is
not that he makes pleasing things happen but that he makes pleasing judgmental
statements. The position itself is the political commodity.”76 The political setting of
position taking can vary. For example, members can take a certain position through floor
speeches, press releases, or television appearances.77 For most representatives, it is
rational to maintain their past views and adopt new ones with caution if it is necessary.78
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Taking innovative positions, however, may make more sense for members who are in
electoral danger; entrepreneurial position taking is politically intelligent if a member
faces defeat because their old positions may not fit the views of the electorate.79 Mayhew
gives the example of Senator Joseph McCarthy who faced a difficult re-election
campaign in 1952, so he turned anti-communism into his calling card in 1950.80 The
relationship between position taking and voter behavior, however, is very difficult to
measure because as Mayhew says, there is a variance problem: members do not differ
much in the position-taking methods.81 Despite the difficulties in measuring the electoral
impact, position taking is still a crucial component of how members of Congress try to
get re-elected.
All three activities are still alive and well today. The electioneering strategies,
however, have evolved. The three re-election activities are also more connected. For
example, TV ads for candidates that advertise their campaign and advocate for certain
positions can also include credit claiming about certain government benefits.
Since the 1970s, political advertising has grown into multi-billion-dollar
industry.82 During the 2010 midterm elections, independent expenditure (IEs) groups
spent $4 billion on advertising, in part because of the Citizens United Supreme Court
decision.83 IEs spent only $69 million during the 2006 midterm elections and $27.2
million in 2002.84 On October 14th, 2010, the Center for Responsive Politics reported that
outside political organizations gave more than $153 million to independent expenditures
that overtly supported or opposed candidates for federal office.85 The independent
expenditure spending tripled between 2006 and 2010 election cycles.86 The emergence of
social media also changed political advertising and its reach.
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During the 2010 midterms, many voters engaged with politics online. More than
half of American adults were online political users during the 2010 elections, according
to a Pew Research Center poll conducted from November 3rd-24th, 2010.87 The survey
also found that 1 in 5 adults, or 22% of the respondents, used Twitter or a social
networking site for political purposes.88 In the survey, 53% of adult internet users said
they did at least one of the eleven online political actions that Pew measured, including
sharing election content, watching political videos, and “fact checking” politicians’
claims.89 The survey also found that 31% of adult internet users watched political videos
online in the months before the 2010 election which was a 12% increase from
respondents after the 2006 midterms.90 Nationalization effects were also present: 20% of
online adults followed an election in another part of the country.91 The three groups that
were most likely to follow a campaign outside of their geographic location were males,
whites, and respondents with strong views, especially people who supported or opposed
the Tea Party movement.92 The 2010 midterms also coincided with the rise of a new
communications era that has since become the norm for campaigns.
The 2008 presidential election represented the beginning of a new era in political
media.93 For example, campaign websites became a central location for voters to find
information about the race, donate to the candidate, volunteer, and watch campaign
videos.94 The key development, however, was social media, including Facebook and
YouTube, which Americans used to share election information and organize for
campaigns.95 The media developments in 2008 continued during the 2010 midterms when
Twitter and blogging websites played a larger role in the political discourse.96 Despite the
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rise of social media, however, TV was still the main source for election news in 2010 for
voters.97
Issuing press releases is an important credit claiming method. In “Appropriators,
not Position Takers: The Distorting Effects of Electoral Incentives on Congressional
Representation,” Justin Grimmer analyzes over 64,000 Senate press releases between
2005 and 2007 and concludes, among other findings, that senators in swing states
emphasize appropriations in their press release communications instead of policy
positions.98 In his book Representational Styles in Congress, Grimmer mentions that
press releases can generate coverage of the member, especially in local newspapers
where the publications sometimes use the exact language in the release for articles.99
Press releases also drive coverage of the member in non-election years.100 The press
releases allow representatives to control the information framing independent of
reporters’ articles.101 With the digitization of releases, press secretaries can disseminate
the information quickly to a large list of reporters ,which allows communications teams
to shape the narrative early.102 Much of credit claiming has also moved to Twitter in
recent years. Annelise Russell found that senators from rural states and rank-and-file
members dominate credit claiming on Twitter.103 Party leaders, however, spend more
time position taking on the social media site.104 Technology has bolstered credit
claiming’s role in the re-election process.
Social media sites create a communications environment for members of
Congress to engage in position-taking before a national audience. A 2013 Congressional
Research Service (CRS) report found 83.4% of the House of Representatives members
and senators had a Twitter account, and 90% of the representatives were registered on
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Facebook.105 CRS focused on the period between August and October 2011 where a total
of 30,765 tweets were sent and 16,261 Facebook posts were published.106 The report
coded the tweets and Facebook posts into seven categories: “position taking, district or
state, official congressional action, policy statement, media, personal, and other.”107 CRS
defined position taking as the following, “Tweets or Facebook posts in which a
Representative or Senator took a position on a policy or political issue. The expressed
position could concern a specific bill under consideration or a general policy
issue.”108After CRS gathered the data, the results found position taking was the most
frequent category for both Twitter and Facebook posts at 41% and 39%, respectively.109
The second most frequent category was “district or state” with 26% of tweets and 39% of
the Facebook posts.110
A study at the Illinois Institute of Technology reached a similar conclusion about
position taking on Twitter among members of Congress. In “What’s Congress Doing on
Twitter?” the authors used data from 380 members of Congress Twitter accounts in
December 2012.111 They found that the most common Twitter behavior is providing
information (41%) followed by position taking (22%).112 Both the CRS and Illinois
Institute of Technology findings highlight an important feature of how social media aids
a member of Congress’s re-election activities. Position taking still dominates as a
political strategy, even above references to a home district or state. Now, it is even easier
for Congress members to communicate their views to both their constituencies and
outside actors through social media platforms.
In a preface to a later edition of Congress: The Electoral Connection, David
Mayhew addresses how he views the book in a post 1970s political context. He mentions
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that he was disappointed with how the political science community viewed his concept of
position taking, “I remain convinced that politicians often get rewarded for taking
positions rather than achieving effects.”113 Though it is implicit in the preface, Mayhew
seems to think that political scientists have misplaced their focus on legislative
productivity and its relationship to re-election, dismissing position taking as an electoral
commodity. He later says, “In general, my guess is that position taking has not been
examined thoroughly since 1974 because its importance exceeds its modelability. And if
it implicates causal relations it is especially tough to address.”114 This thesis re-centers
position taking, along with advertising and credit claiming, as the key framing to analyze
House members’ political behavior. It will also not make correlative claims between the
three re-election activities and electoral success. Instead, the thesis will analyze multiple
Blue Dog Democratic campaigns to construct an argument about how those
electioneering strategies interacted with a nationalized political environment. The
scholarly contribution of the work is not to discover new explanations of electoral loss,
but rather to understand how nationalization shaped Blue Dog Democrats and their localoriented re-election activities.
The first two chapters have covered what nationalization is and David Mayhew’s
important scholarly contribution in Congress: The Electoral Connection. The three reelection activities he outlines in the book will be crucial for the rest of the thesis to
analyze Blue Dog Democrats’ campaigns and the issues that defined the elections. The
next chapter will contextualize the political environment before the 2010 midterms,
including the major policy accomplishments during the first term of Barack Obama’s
presidency and the rise of the Tea Party movement. It will also cover the results of the
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2010 midterms and set the stage to introduce the focus of this thesis: the Blue Dog
Coalition.
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Chapter 3: “A Shellacking:” The Nationalization of President Obama’s
First Two Years
On November 3rd, 2010, President Barack Obama spoke to the press about the
2010 midterm results, “Now, I'm not recommending for every future president that they
take a shellacking like I did last night. I'm sure there are easier ways to learn these
lessons. But I do think that, you know, this is a growth process. And an evolution."115 The
night before, Republicans picked up 63 seats in the US House of Representatives and 6
seats in the US Senate.116 In the next Congress, Republicans would have more seats in the
US House than at any time since the 1940s.117 Among the victims of the Republicans’
massive electoral victory were the Blue Dog Democrats, a group of fiscally conservative
liberals who represented swing districts. Republicans, and especially the conservative Tea
Party Movement, nationalized the 2010 midterms by focusing on the weak economy and
Obama’s legislative agenda.118 This chapter will provide an overview of President
Obama’s early legislative accomplishments, the rise of the Tea Party Movement, and
what happened on November 2nd, 2010.
The first Black President entered the Oval Office amid the most serious economic
crisis since the Great Depression. Banks were on the brink of collapse and the economy
stopped growing with an unemployment rate of 10 percent.119 Foreclosures soared and
housing prices plummeted.120 President Obama and congressional leaders had to move
quickly to avert a complete economic meltdown.
On the campaign trail, Obama endorsed President George W. Bush’s Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP).121 TARP was a $700 billion bailout program for the
country’s leading banks that lent enough money to maintain their solvency.122 When he
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became President, Obama authorized $60 billion in TARP funds for General Motors and
Chrysler in order to keep the American car industry from entering bankruptcy.123 The
automobile companies survived the crisis after they received TARP funding; auto
corporations repaid the federal government more than $600 billion at the end of 2009.124
Despite the policy’s success, the political optics were poor: many voters viewed TARP as
a bailout for corporate leaders and bankers.125
Obama’s first major legislative accomplishment was the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act) signed into law on February 17th, 2009.126 The
Recovery Act was an $800 billion stimulus package that aimed to prevent further layoffs
in the public sector and create new jobs in other industries, including renewable
energy.127 One-third of the legislation went towards middle-class tax cuts and another
third funded various infrastructure projects, including bridge and highway
construction.128 Research and development grants were included in the infrastructure
investment for renewable energy, specifically wind and solar; the renewable energy
sector grew in the years after the Recovery Act.129 Politically, Obama wanted bipartisan
support for the Recovery Act.130 No Republican House members and only three
Republican senators, however, voted for it.131
A major part of President Obama’s domestic policy agenda was health care
reform-- a pillar of the Democratic Party’s agenda since Harry Truman.132 The most
recent attempt before Obama to overhaul the health care system was President Bill
Clinton’s failed Health Security Act in 1993.133 The political difficulties of reform were
familiar to the Obama Administration, and the President decided to pursue health care
policy in the beginning of his first term while his approval was high and Democrats
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controlled both chambers of Congress.134 There was Democratic caucus division on
Capitol Hill, however, in how to reform the health care system.135 Some Democratic
members supported a “public option,” or a federal government-run health insurance plan
for uninsured Americans.136 Others, however, supported a private insurance expansion;
more than 75 percent of Americans had a private insurance plan and many worried that a
new system would negatively affect their coverage.137
In order to navigate these internal political divisions, President Obama thought
that any health care reform policy had to be budget-neutral, or save as much as it spent.138
Drawing lessons from Clinton’s failure, Obama brought the hospital and pharmaceutical
industries to the negotiating table and invited Congress to help develop the legislation.139
Nevertheless, members of Congress felt pressure from constituents back who opposed
“Obamacare.”140 The opposition grew out of the powerful conservative Tea Party
movement whose members went to constituent town hall meetings to voice their
disapproval.141 The Tea Party movement would become a political force that eventually
helped sweep the Republicans into the US House majority. Republicans were winning the
messaging war for the health care debate, and so President Obama decided to use the
bully pulpit to deliver an address about the proposal to Congress on September 9th,
2009.142
The speech succeeded in curbing congressional opposition to reform.143 Obama
then persuaded many members of Congress to support the reform; the Senate and the US
House passed their own versions of the health care reform proposal after a difficult
legislative process that sometimes looked like it would end in failure.144 On March 23rd,
2010, Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). 145 The ACA
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quickly became the central target for Republicans to attack after its passage; the GOP
wanted to tie Democratic members of Congress to the ACA and President Obama’s
liberal agenda. The Tea Party and its conservative followers led the way in telling that
story, culminating in a 2010 Republican sweep of the US House of Representatives.
The Tea Party Movement (TPM) was a grassroots conservative movement that
began in 2009. 146 There was no leader or national organization, but the Koch Brothers’
group Americans for Prosperity supported various Tea Party activist groups through
providing trainings and transportation to congressional town halls.147 Members were
older white citizens who were well educated, wealthier than the average American, and
more conservative than the average GOP voter.148 The dispersed movement had small
local groups with usually around 200 members who held far right views and were
skeptical of establishment Republicans.149 Activists were inspired by the Sons of Liberty,
a group of men in Massachusetts in the early 1750s.150 Samuel Adams led the Sons of
Liberty, and he mobilized people to protest the taxes that King George and the British
House of Commons imposed on the Colonies.151 Adams’ most famous protest was
against the Tea Act of 1773 which triggered mass protests across the Colonies and
increased support for American independence.152
One causal story about how the Tea Party formed is worth noting. In 2009, Rick
Santelli, a CNBC journalist who covered bond markets at the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange, gave a passionate speech on CNBC’s “Squawk Box.”153 He was angry that
policymakers in Washington DC bailed out sectors that struggled during the 2008
Recession, “I’m mad as hell and I’m not going to take it anymore.”154 He then asked
traders on the Chicago Exchange floor if they would bail out their neighbors who
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irresponsibly spent too much money on their houses.155 The traders responded with “no”
and Santelli said that he would plan a “tea party” in Chicago to demonstrate their
anger.156 He ended the rant with a question, “President Obama, are you listening?”157
After his speech, millions of Americans formed Tea Party associations across the
country.158 This thesis does not argue that Santelli caused the Tea Party movement, but it
is important to acknowledge his role in the movement’s origin story.
Members of the Tea Party Movement, similar to Samuel Adams and the Sons of
Liberty, were driven by patriotism and opposition to high taxes.159 TPM activists wanted
to reclaim freedoms that they thought the federal government took away through
regulation, deficits, unsustainable debt, and taxes.160 TPM did not have a political party
affiliation, but activists began with targeting establishment Republicans because of the
GOP’s tradition of fiscal conservatism.161 Tea Party activists were part of an elusive
political network that organized around a shared feeling: America’s future was at risk
after the election of Barack Obama in 2008.162 The ideological origins of the movement
can be traced back to a young lawyer from Houston Texas named Ryan Hecker.163
Ryan Hecker was a Texas attorney who wanted to pressure Congress members to
follow fiscally conservative policies.164 He thought that congressional Republicans lost
legitimacy to govern because they stopped listening to ordinary citizens’ concerns,
especially about federal spending.165 The 2008 financial crisis was a turning point for
Hecker because Republicans joined Democrats to authorize TARP, the $700 billion
bailout for banks.166 After the 2008 election, Republicans criticized TARP despite voting
for the program; many conservative voters viewed the establishment Republicans as
hypocritical panderers who wanted to win in the 2010 midterms.167 After the election of
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Barack Obama, Hecker co-founded the Houston Tea Party Society and wrote the
“Contract For America.”168 The platform’s objective: influence the 2010 midterm
elections.169
“Contract From America” became the TPM’s ideological foundation.170 Inspired
by Newt Gingrich’s 1994 “Contract With America,” Hecker’s Contract was a 10 point
agenda that guided Tea Party candidates’ policies for the 2010 midterms.171 The 10 points
included: “Protect the Constitution”; “Reject Cap and Trade”; “Demand a Balanced
Budget”; “Enact Fundamental Tax Reform”; “Restore Fiscal Responsibility and
Constitutionally Limited Government”; “End Runaway Government Spending”;
“Defund, Repeal, and Replace Government-Run Health Care”; “Pass an “All-of-theabove” Energy Policy”; “Stop the Pork”; “Stop the Tax Hikes.” The “Contract From
America” was unveiled at “Tax Day” rallies on April 15th, 2010 across the country.172
Tea Party activists pressured all Republican candidates for Congress who associated
themselves with the Tea Party to sign on to the Contract.173 On November 2nd, 2010, the
“Contract From America” and its Republican allies succeeded.
The Republican midterm sweep was predictable based on long standing electoral
behavior; the party that holds the presidency had lost House seats in 14 of the 16
midterms between 1946 and 2006, averaging a loss of about 24 seats.174 The magnitude
of the win, however, surprised many political observers. Voters did not like the state of
the economy: 62% of exit poll respondents said it was the most important issue of the
midterms.175 What was notable about the 2010 midterms was that it was widely viewed
as a highly nationalized election.176 The Tea Party was a key reason for why the election
was nationalized because TPM-backed candidates ran campaigns focused on
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controversial national issues, such as the ACA and Recovery Act of 2009.177 The
nationalization strategy was very effective: 60 out of 63 Republican candidates who won
seats in the House of Representatives were Tea Party-supported.178 Moderate Democrats,
or members of the Blue Dog Democrat Coalition, lost many of their seats to Tea Party
candidates.179
The Blue Dog Coalition was--and still is--a caucus of moderate, fiscally
conservative House Democrats who represent swing districts. The coalition’s founding
members formed the caucus after the 1994 midterm elections when Republicans took
both chambers of Congress, winning 54 seats in the House and 8 seats in the US
Senate.180 Blue Dog members thought the 1994 midterms demonstrated that the
Democratic Party had become too liberal, so a voting bloc was required in Congress to
represent moderate, fiscally responsible views.181 The Blue Dog name is based on both
the Blue Dog paintings by George Rodrigue and the term “Yellow Dog Democrat” in
reference to Democratic voters who would have voted for a yellow dog before a
Republican; The founding Blue Dog members felt “choked blue” by the political parties’
extremes.182 The Blue Dog Coalition members are known for promoting strong national
defense policy and working with Republicans on bipartisan legislation.183
More than half of the Blue Dog Democrats’ coalition lost in the 2010 midterms,
including Stephanie Herseth Sandlin of South Dakota and Baron Hill of Indiana, who
were the Coalition’s two leaders.184 Many Blue Dogs blamed the nationalization of the
midterms for their losses; the members tried to separate themselves from President
Obama’s agenda and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi but failed.185 The height of the Blue
Dog Coalition’s power was in 2009 when the caucus had 54 members.186 At the start of
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the 112th Congress in 2011, they had 31 members and in 2015, they had only 14.187
Congress has become more polarized because voters have become more ideological,
especially during the 2010 midterms.188 Voters in 2010 sent 60 candidates to Congress
who were more conservative than the establishment GOP. The Blue Dogs’ moderate
positions and home style, or constituent-focused approach, is a useful counterweight to
the nationalization of President Obama’s agenda during the 2010 midterms. Blue Dog
Democrats represented the most politically competitive districts in the country. Many
members in 2010 lost because their images were transformed from a local, well-liked
representative to an extension of the national Democratic Party. Blue Dog Democrats are
the focus for the rest of the thesis because of what nationalization did to their political
careers, despite their best efforts to separate themselves from congressional Democratic
leadership and Barack Obama.
In the following chapters, Mayhew’s three re-election activities will be applied to
the campaigns of two Blue Dog Coalition members: Stephanie Herseth Sandlin (SD-At
Large) and Harry Mitchell (AZ-5th). Both members lost in 2010. They represented two
different types of districts across the country and took differing positions on major
Democratic agenda items, including the ACA. Their political calculations varied, but
nationalization still defeated them. The campaign analyses will provide insight into how
swing district representation—and the re-election strategies that the two Blue Dogs
employed—failed them in the nationalized political environment.
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Chapter 4: The Last US House Democrat to Represent South Dakota
On November 3rd, 2010, Representative Stephanie Herseth Sandlin of South Dakota’s
At-Large District lost to Republican Kristi Noem by three percentage points.189 Sandlin
was a leader of the Blue Dog Coalition and held one of the most conservative voting
records for any Democrat in the US House.190 Noem, who is now governor of South
Dakota, was a Tea Party rising star and raised twice as much money as Sandlin, hauling
in $1.1 million three months before the election.191 Outside spending against Sandlin also
totaled $1,167,325 which was a large sum for a House race in 2010.192 In the 111th
Congress from 2009-2010, Sandlin voted against major party policy priorities. In
advertisements, she tried to separate herself from the national Democratic leadership,
including President Obama and Speaker Nancy Pelosi. Her strategy, however, failed on
election night. Her home style, conservative approach became obsolete in the
nationalized political environment; Sandlin was an extension of the polarizing national
Democratic Party instead of a well-liked local representative who had previously won her
re-elections.
Stephanie Sandlin was first elected in 2004 when she defeated Republican Larry
Diedrich.193 She won her 2006 and 2008 re-election campaigns comfortably.194 In
Congress, she served on the House Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Veteran Affairs
Committees.195 Her legislative accomplishments included co-sponsoring the 2008 Farm
Bill that supported South Dakotan farmers, renewable biofuel technology legislation, and
a women veterans’ health care bill that increased education benefits for Iraq and
Afghanistan soldiers.196 She became the co-chair of the Blue Dog Coalition in 2008 and
often voted with Republicans.197 Sandlin voted for the 2009 Recovery Act, but bucked
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party leadership when she voted against TARP, the ACA, and American Clean Energy
and Security Act.198 In general, Sandlin was a bipartisan lawmaker who was not afraid to
cross Democratic congressional leadership or President Obama’s agenda; according to a
2009 National Journal vote model, Sandlin had a 51.5% score, meaning she cast more
liberal votes than 51.5% of the entire House of Representatives caucus.199 As the 2010
midterm approached, Sandlin faced Kristi Noem.
Kristi Noem was elected to the South Dakota House of Representatives in 2006 and
became the assistant majority leader in 2008.200 She focused on reducing regulations in
energy development and passed state budget cuts.201 In 2010, she entered a competitive
Republican primary for the US House seat and emphasized her background as a small
business owner and rancher.202 She also stressed her state government experience during
the primary, highlighting the budget cuts and low tax policies she guided through the
chamber.203 In the general election, Tea Party activists supported her as well as
establishment groups such as the National Republican Congressional Committee
(NRCC).204 On the campaign trail, Noem promised to vote to repeal the ACA and
opposed the 2009 Recovery Act.205 She also supported a balanced federal budget and
attacked Sandlin for voting to raise the debt ceiling.206 Noem tied Sandlin to President
Obama’s agenda, painting her has a party loyalist. Her time in the 111th Congress,
however, tells a different story. An analysis of her co-sponsored bills and press releases
will reveal that she was a fiscally conservative Democrat who understood her rural
constituency; Sandlin was committed to a home style strategy that collided at times with
the national Democratic Party.
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Stephanie Sandlin’s legislation in the 111th Congress signaled her fiscal conservative
policy position. Bill sponsorship is a form of position-taking: the support of certain
legislation expresses to a constituency what kind of values and policies that the member
prioritizes. In the 111th Congress, Sandlin cosponsored 11 fiscally conservative policy
bills that all focused on the reduction of public spending.207 The titles included: “Truth in
Spending Act of 2010,” “Stop Waste by Eliminating Excessive Programs Act of 2010,”
“Reduce Unnecessary Spending Act of 2010,” “Fiscal Honesty and Accountability Act of
2009,” and a balanced budget amendment for the US Constitution.208 As the co-chair of
the Blue Dogs, she supported fiscal conservative policies that also suggested to her voters
that she was not aligned with other Democrats who supported high spending measures.
Sandlin cosponsored 60 bills health care bills despite her vote against the Affordable
Care Act.209 South Dakota’s At-Large District included an aging population; Medicare
was an important policy for many of Sandlin’s voters.210 She cosponsored bills such as
the “Medicare Prescription Drug Price Negotiation Act of 2010,” “Patient Health and
Real Medication Access Cost Savings Act of 2009,” and “Medicare Payment
Improvement Act of 2009.”211 On the campaign trail in 2010, Sandlin voted against the
Affordable Care Act because she thought it was too expensive and did not include the
provisions she worked on for South Dakota.212 Her vote against the ACA signaled her
economic concerns, but she also recognized that affordable health care, which is a pillar
of the national Democratic agenda, was also a crucial South Dakotan issue. She bucked
President Obama’s vision for affordable health care while putting together a health voting
record that she thought would deliver good public policy and, in return, votes for her-
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reelection. Press releases can also provide more insight into her political calculus for both
position taking and credit claiming.
Many of Representative Sandlin’s press releases during the 111th Congress focused
on her commitment to fiscal conservatism; the messaging was consistent with her
legislative track record. On January 27th, 2010, Sandlin’s office issued a press release
about President Obama’s State of the Union Address. It began, “Tonight, the President
rightly highlighted the critical need to get spending under control and reduce the national
debt, and the importance of meeting the needs of the private sector to achieve sustainable
economic growth.”213 She then argued that Congress needed to do more to reduce
spending, “I support the President’s proposals to freeze spending but we must do more,
including identifying ways to cut government overspending, passing legislation requiring
Congress to spend within its means and establishing an independent, bipartisan
commission to address our national debt.”214 She supported her party’s president when it
came to spending reduction, but her office made sure to communicate that the Democrats
could always do more to implement fiscally economic policies.
In a January 21st, 2009, press release, Sandlin’s communications team discussed her
opposition to the TARP bailout, “U.S Rep. Stephanie Herseth Sandlin today reiterated
her opposition to the Troubled Asset Program, or TARP, as having too little
accountability and not enough protection for taxpayers.”215 The press release continued,
“This poorly managed program is a missed opportunity to address the root causes of the
financial crisis. I continue to believe we need more oversight, more accountability, and a
better plan going forward, and I do not support release of the second $350 billion in these
circumstances.”216 On March 2nd, 2010, Sandlin issued a press release on her support for
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a Constitutional Balanced Budget Amendment, “Every day, families across South Dakota
live by common-sense rules that require them to balance their budgets and Congress can
and should do the same. I’m proud to again support this balanced budget amendment, a
critical part of our overall strategy to get our country’s fiscal house in order.”217 All three
press releases highlighted her consistent fiscal conservative message that tried to create
political space from the national Democratic Party. She brought the same Blue Dog
strategy to the campaign trail against Kristi Noem.
A debate on October 27th, 2010, between Sandlin and Noem highlighted Sandlin’s
strategy of keeping the national Democratic Party at arm’s length. Debates, like press
releases, are an opportunity to both credit-claim and position-take. Specifically,
lawmakers can inform the electorate of their legislative activity and support certain
politically favorable policy positions that draws a contrast with their opponents. In her
opening statement, Sandlin said, “I’ve stood up to both political parties to do what’s right
on behalf of South Dakota—to strengthen our economy, to make smart, targeted
investments. I’ve been one of the few members of Congress who has been consistent on
debt and deficits and restoring fiscal discipline.”218 She laid out her arguments about why
she should be re-elected, and Sandlin echoed similar messages in her press releases: the
South Dakota Democrat was a fiscal conservative who put the state ahead of the
Democratic Party. The debate started with questions about the American Recovery Act.
Noem tried to nationalize the Recovery Act discussion after the Congresswoman pointed
out that Noem and the South Dakota state legislature took the stimulus funding despite
her criticism of the bill, “The reason that the legislature decided to take those dollars was
because the Congresswoman and her leadership that she agrees with ties our hands. We
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didn’t have the option to not take the dollars and let it go back to pay down our debt”219
Noem connected Sandlin to Speaker Pelosi and Democratic congressional leadership on
Capitol Hill despite the member’s clear disagreements with them; nationalization was at
the center of Noem’s counter argument to Sandlin’s vote for the stimulus package.
Stephanie Sandlin’s vote against the Affordable Care Act separated her from the
national Democratic Party agenda, but Noem still linked President Obama to the Blue
Dog. Sandlin outlined the reasons why she voted against the ACA, “I was concerned
about increased eligibility rates under Medicaid and the pressures it would put on the
state’s budget. I was concerned with the cuts to Medicare and the cuts to our long-term
care facilities in South Dakota…It wasn’t a responsible bill. It was deeply flawed and
that’s why I opposed it.”220 Sandlin clearly articulated the specific reasons why she voted
against her own party’s most significant policy initiative. Nevertheless, Noem still
painted her as a Democratic Party loyalist:
The Congresswoman is part of the Congress that got this bill passed and gave us
government run health care… From the very beginning, I was going to hold her
accountable to…her endorsement of this administration and leadership that she put
into place. The president she endorsed, campaigned for, and voted for who has set the
agenda for the past two years that has led us down this path. I was going to talk about
that because South Dakotans are alarmed by the direction this country is going.221
In the health care portion of the debate, Noem did not acknowledge Sandlin’s policy
qualms with the ACA. Instead, Noem characterized Congresswoman Sandlin as an
extension of a Democratic-controlled Congress that passed an overreaching, governmentled health care system. To Noem, Sandlin was an Obama supporter who campaigned for
him; the rhetorical strategy minimized Sandlin’s more conservative voting record and
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enhanced her connection to the Democratic White House. Campaign advertisements also
highlighted the tension of swing district politics in a nationalized midterm race.
Television ads highlighted a home-style approach for Sandlin and Republicans’
nationalization strategy. One of Sandlin’s ads was a position taking strategy to associate
her with conservative South Dakota values, “In Washington, they call this flyover
country. They look down on us from 30,000 feet and don’t care about our agriculture, our
second amendment, or our fiscally conservative values…. I took on liberal leaders to
protect our right to own guns and fought people in both parties who just want to throw
money away.”222 In the ad, Sandlin did not even mention she was a Democrat; she
sounded like a conservative Republican. Her positions on the Second Amendment,
budget policy, and agriculture were to the right of almost all House Democrats. Sandlin
understood her conservative electorate and reflected its values. Despite this home style
approach, the National Republican Committee (NRCC), like Noem, painted her as a
liberal ideologue, “Stephanie Herseth Sandlin said she’ll always vote for what’s right for
South Dakota. She voted with Nancy Pelosi 91% of the time. If she thinks that’s right for
South Dakota, then Washington DC really has changed Stephanie Herseth Sandlin.”223
The NRCC and Kristi Noem shared the same message: Representative Sandlin is a
puppet of Nancy Pelosi, Barack Obama, and the national Democratic Party; her fiscal
conservative credentials and home style strategy were erased. Media interviews with
Sandlin and Noem also highlighted the nationalization-local representation divide.
The battle to nationalize the South Dakota congressional campaign was clear
during an ABC News interview in September 2010. Jonathan Karl of ABC News
interviewed candidates about the state of the race. Karl asked Sandlin what grade she
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would give Obama and she responded, “It depends on what issue we are talking about. I
think that I would give him a C-range overall…. on some other issues, some of the
agency action I haven’t been pleased with as it relates to the commitment we would be
having to ethanol and biodiesel and an understanding of rural America and dealing with
our forestry issues, I don’t think he’s done a great job.”224 Sandlin voted against the ACA
for both substantive policy and political reasons. In the interview, she continued the
messaging strategy that created distance between her and Barack Obama, pointing to
South Dakota-specific issues that he failed to deliver on. Later in the interview, Karl
addressed Noem’s nationalization strategy, “She [Noem] says you are a vote for Nancy
Pelosi as Speaker of the House.” Sandlin responded, “John Boehner is no picnic for
South Dakota, either. John Boehner voted against the Farm Bill…. This isn’t about
Boehner and Pelosi. This is about Kristi Noem and Stephanie Herseth Sandlin and who’s
elected and inspires the confidence of South Dakota voters and who’s going to do what’s
right for the state and not be a rubber stamp for either party.”225 Sandlin was well-aware
of how Noem framed Sandlin as a Pelosi follower and made clear that a vote for the Blue
Dog meant South Dakota would elect an independent, centrist voice. Despite a voting
record and position taking strategies that supported Sandlin’s moderate values, Noem
nationalized Sandlin.
Karl asked Noem about Sandlin’s tenure in Congress as the two rode horses in
South Dakota. Karl pointed out that Sandlin crossed Democratic leadership on Capitol
Hill with her votes against the ACA, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Bill, and the
American Clean Energy and Security Act.226 Noem barely addressed such votes and
emphasized the apparent inconsistency between Sandlin’s campaign strategy in South
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Dakota and her time in DC, “That’s how she is campaigning back here in SD, as a
moderate, independent voice for South Dakota. But when you really start looking and
pointing at her voting record and the fact she is voting with Nancy Pelosi 9 out of 10
times. You look specifically at the health care bill: she voted against it, but since then,
she wouldn’t work to repeal it.”227 Then, Karl pressed Noem to identify similarities
between the Speaker and Sandlin, “We’ve certainly seen that over the past two years.
They have voted a lot alike, like the stimulus package.”228 Noem selectively identified
one vote that Sandlin shared with Democratic leadership in the House despite Sandlin’s
mixed voting record with the Democrats. Noem consistently made the calculation
throughout the campaign that she could characterize Sandlin’s tenure in Congress as an
extension of Nancy Pelosi and Barack Obama’s liberal agenda. The strategy was
misleading, but the nationalization approach succeeded on election night.
In the same ABC interview, Sandlin gave a glimpse of how she viewed
congressional representation, “Here in South Dakota, I’ve always known it’s a swing
district. That’s the way it should be in my opinion for every congressional district.”229
Two months before the election, she was cautiously confident about her re-election
prospects and understood the political dynamics of her at-large swing district. She then
narrowly lost to a candidate who had the support of the NRC and the Tea Party.
Stephanie Herseth Sandlin’s loss poses an important theoretical and political question:
what is the future of swing district representation in a nationalized Congress? This
chapter provided clear illustrations of how Sandlin’s home style approach could not
triumph over nationalization. A similar result occurred in Tempe, Arizona, when Blue
Dog Harry Mitchell lost to David Schweikert, another Tea Party-backed candidate. An
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analysis of Mitchell’s race will provide insight into how the tides of nationalization
shaped his political fate.
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Chapter 5: Lap Dog or Lone Wolf
Politico published an article titled “Arizona race hinges on national party” three
months before the November 2010 election. The author began the piece with an analogy
that perfectly described the nationalized race, “The question facing voters in Arizona’s 5th
District is whether Democratic Rep. Harry Mitchell is more lap dog or lone wolf.” 230 The
piece focused on Representative Harry Mitchell’s difficult re-election campaign against
his Republican challenger David Schweikert. The Schweikert campaign posted signs
across the Tempe district that called Mitchell a “lap dog” for Speaker Nancy Pelosi.231
Mitchell, a two-term Democratic incumbent, voted for the 2008 TARP bailouts, the 2009
Recovery Act, and the Affordable Care Act.232 The nationalization of politics in
Arizona’s 5th District loomed throughout the Politico article. The author quoted
Schweikert: “The sheer fact that he voted for Obamacare will basically end his career.”233
In the end, voters saw Harry Mitchell as a lap dog for the national Democratic Party. Like
more than half of the Blue Dog Coalition, Mitchell could not escape President Obama’s
poor approval ratings. This chapter will analyze numerous primary sources, such as press
releases, a debate, and campaign advertisements, to argue that his traditional swing
district representation strategies could not defeat nationalization.
On November 3rd, 2010, Schweikert beat Mitchell by 9 points.234 The 2010 race
was a rematch between the two candidates who faced each other in 2008.235 That time,
Mitchell beat Schweikert by 10 points.236 Schweikert, a former member of the Arizona
House of Representatives, had Tea Party support in 2010.237 The difference between
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those two election years was who occupied the White House: In 2008, George W. Bush
was at the end of his second term and in 2010, President Obama just signed the ACA. As
this thesis has noted, midterms are usually referendums on the incumbent president. The
focus on the White House, however, is also a product of campaign strategy. As political
scientist Alan Abramowitz said, “national issues can become a local issue if these issues
are raised by local candidates.”238 Across the country, Republican campaigns chose to
connect their opponents to the national Democratic agenda.
Harry Mitchell had deep roots in Tempe, Arizona. His political legacy is
physically present around the city: there is a 35-foot statue of him outside Tempe City
Hall and its government offices are called the “Harry E. Mitchell Government
Complex.”239 He was a teacher and professor in the area before serving as a member of
the Tempe City Council from 1970 to 1978.240 He was then elected mayor from 1978-84
and served in the Arizona Senate from 1999 to 2006.241 In 2006, he served as the
Chairman of the Arizona Democratic Party before running for Congress.242 Mitchell
served in both the 110th and 111th Congresses from 2007-2011.243 Harry was a member of
the Science, Transportation and Infrastructure, and Veterans’ Affairs Committees.244
Mitchell’s press releases signaled his Blue Dog, fiscally conservative re-election
approach.
In an April 2009, press release entitled “Mitchell Calls for Accountability for
TARP Funds…Again,” Mitchell’s office communicated that the member wanted more
oversight over how TARP funds were spent, “U.S. Rep. Harry Mitchell and the House of
Representatives passed legislation to overhaul the Troubled Assets Relief Program and
strengthen accountability measures today. The legislation will work to better protect
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taxpayer dollars used to stabilize the nation’s financial markets and open up the credit
markets to benefit families and businesses.”245 Congressman Mitchell voted for the 2008
TARP bill but emphasized through the press release that continued bailouts required
more oversight.246
In another press release, his office advertised his vote against the Democratic
budget, “U.S. Rep. Harry Mitchell today voted against the Democratic budget resolution,
saying the measure does not extend key tax cuts…. Mitchell was one of only 20
Democrats to vote against the resolution.”247 The press release ended with a quote from
the Congressman, “It ought to concern Democrats as well as Republicans when important
tax cuts face expiration. Given the unique economic difficulties we face as a nation, we
need to retain tax cuts that will encourage the kind of investment that stimulates
growth.”248 Congressman Mitchell’s concern for fiscal responsibility was clear in the
release and wanted to signal that he was willing to vote against his party’s budget.
Mitchell emphasized bipartisanship when he needed to comment on the Obama
Administration. In a press release on President Obama’s first address to Congress,
Congressman Mitchell focused on the need for bipartisan cooperation: “President Obama
struck the right tone for our nation right now. The people of the United States are
uncertain and nervous about their economic future. They are struggling to make ends
meet and are in no mood for partisan politics. The President called upon us to work
together to find solutions, and I believe we must do so. The problems we face right now
are too serious for any of us to do otherwise."249 He did not criticize President Obama
like Representative Sandlin, but his Blue Dog, centrist messaging was apparent.
Mitchell’s press office also did not praise the recently enacted American Recovery Act.
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Instead, he condemned partisan politics and supported bipartisan solutions. In contrast to
the debate between Sandlin and Noem, Congressman Mitchell’s debate with David
Schweikert focused on district issues.
The debate between the two candidates centered on the economic development
for the Tempe area. In the beginning of the debate, both candidates unsurprisingly said
that the economy was the most pressing issue facing the country.250 The debate topics
included major policy issues including the 2009 Recovery Act, the Affordable Care Act,
and immigration policy. In contrast to Sandlin’s debate, the two candidates in Arizona
focused on serious public policy disagreements and Schweikert did not actively try to
nationalize Mitchell. The incumbent argued that his vote for the stimulus package helped
stimulate the economy through tax cuts.251
When asked to defend his vote for the ACA, Mitchell said, “We could not
continue with the status quo. Every year, the cost of medicine went up for individuals,
businesses, and the government.”252 His answer prompted a debate about the market’s
role in health care. Schweikert responded, “You either believe in a government top-down,
management control with 158 board and commissions in this health care bill or markets,
properly managed and properly incentivized, that will work better.”253 Schweikert made
an important comment on the philosophical differences between Republicans and
Democrats. He also did not use the ACA as an opportunity to tie Mitchell to Obama.
Congressman Mitchell responded with a defense of the bill’s market impact, “One of the
great parts of this bill is that it works with the market and encourages competitiveness”254
Surprisingly, the ACA portion of the debate was focused on its policy implications, not
the politics of the legislation.
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The debate also focused on a significant district-specific policy issue:
immigration. The Obama Administration framed its immigration policies with a security
focus. The Obama White House immigration website signaled the emphasis on
enforcement, “by setting priorities and focusing its enforcement resources, the Obama
administration has already increased the removal of criminals by more than 80
percent.”255 Mitchell aligned with the President’s national security approach. In the
debate, he discussed his sponsored bill called the “Stop Drop Houses Act of 2010” that
permitted Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and other agencies to seize
property that was used for illegal immigrant smuggling.256 He also voted to increase to
increase fence funding.257
At the end of the debate, the moderator asked Schweikert and Mitchell what issue
they thought should get more attention. Schweikert said: “We are very in debt. We will
soon cross $14 trillion, and a lot of organizations out there say we have $100 trillion of
promises on the books that we have to come through on in the next 75 years. If you love
your children, you like your grandchildren, you are burying the next couple of
generations in something that is unsustainable.”258 Schweikert’s answer was an implicit
condemnation of President Obama’s agenda that increased federal spending, but he did
not specifically criticize the President. It was another moment where Schweikert focused
on broad policy issues without tethering Mitchell to his party leaders. Mitchell criticized
Congress as an institution, “People are upset because they think Congress is
dysfunctional. I’m a member of Congress and I think it’s dysfunctional…Why can’t
people just get together and pass what is best for this country?... I think the most
disappointing part of my time in Congress has been because of the partisanship and the
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fact that people look more to winning an issue than actually trying to solve issues.”259
Mitchell’s answer was a common strategy among members of Congress: representatives
run against Congress as an institution because it is widely unpopular among the public,
including in 2010.260 Political scientist Richard Fenno, however, identified a
contradiction within the strategy, which became known as the “Fenno Paradox.”261 He
found that Americans strongly dislike Congress but they support their own member.262
Mitchell hoped that the “Fenno Paradox” would apply to his campaign. It did not. Unlike
Schweikert’s debate comments, television spots from his campaign, outside groups, and
the national GOP displayed a clear strategy of nationalization.
Republican attack ads tied Harry Mitchell to the national Democratic Party. In a
Schweikert campaign attack ad, the narrator said, “Do Harry Mitchell and Nancy Pelosi
really understand what they have done to our future? They passed Obama’s governmentrun health care. They spent $800 billion on Obama’s failed stimulus plan.”263 In a
National Republican Campaign Committee (NRCC) ad, Mitchell was framed as fiscally
reckless: “Harry Mitchell must think your money grows on trees. Mitchell voted for the
Obama-Pelosi that cost $800 billion, doled out bonuses to Wall Street, but unemployment
went up. He voted for the new health care law that cost $1 trillion dollars. It cuts
Medicare by $500 billion and still, your health care costs will go up. Harry Mitchell
won’t be satisfied until there’s nothing left on the tree.”264 The conservative group
Americans for Prosperity ran an ad that accused Mitchell and Ann Kirkpatrick, another
Democratic Arizona House member, of supporting Nancy Pelosi and not their
constituents, “They voted for Obama and Pelosi’s big government health care plan that
will cost a trillion dollars, limit choices, and cut $500 billion from Medicare. Arizonans
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are overwhelmingly opposed but Kirkpatrick and Mitchell ignore us and put Nancy
Pelosi first…. Tell Kirkpatrick and Mitchell: Fight for Arizona, not Nancy Pelosi’s big
government health care.”265 All three of the ads connected Mitchell to Speaker Nancy
Pelosi and Barack Obama. The advertising strategy was very similar to Kristi Noem and
other Republican House candidates around the country who viewed nationalization as the
most effective messaging approach. Mitchell tried to respond to the attacks through an
emphasis on bipartisanship.
Mitchell focused on his centrist leanings in Congress to distance himself from the
President and other Democratic leaders. One ad included Republicans who endorsed
Harry, “Harry is a different type of politician. He is always willing to listen to new ideas.
I’ve seen him reach across the aisle. He’s our champion. He fights for us.”266 The
Mitchell campaign ran another advertisement that emphasized his bipartisanship, “Harry
Mitchell: Described as a bipartisan, forward thinker. Praised by anti-tax groups for
working to cut taxes, Harry wrote the bipartisan legislation to block pay raises for
politicians.”267 These ads echoed some of his press release position taking and debate
answers. The Blue Dog Coalition was recognized for its members’ bipartisan legislation,
and Mitchell embraced that. One of the ads was also a prime example of credit claiming:
he wanted to ensure that voters knew of his fiscally conservative vote against a pay raise
in Congress. The nationalization of Obama’s agenda, however, was too powerful of a
force despite Mitchell’s messaging as a pragmatic bipartisan representative.
Harry Mitchell embodied the classic home style approach. He was a high school
teacher for 28 years in Tempe before serving as its mayor for 16 years; he was known as
either Mr. Mitchell or Mayor Mitchell by Tempe residents.268 He thought that all politics
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were still local. On election night, it was painfully clear that all politics were national as
Mitchell and most of the Blue Dogs lost their seats. For Mitchell’s race in particular, the
political tension between nationalization and local district representation was intense. His
loss now poses an important question: what will a swing district member of Congress
look like if someone like Harry Mitchell cannot survive nationalization? It is a puzzling
and profoundly important question.
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Conclusion: From Home Style to US Style
In Home Style: House Members in Their Districts, Richard Fenno explores how
lawmakers’ constituency perceptions affects their re-election behavior.269 Fenno argues in
the 1978 work that a representative views his or her constituency in four categories:
geographic district, potential voters, primary supporters, and their intimate personnel
network, including family and advisors.270 The nationalization of Congress has
complicated Fenno’s argument. Contemporary members are clearly concerned with their
districts and the people who live there. National politics, however, cannot be ignored in
the calculations of representatives. Some members of Congress—usually those represent
politically safe districts—fundraise off controversial issues from people across the
country. Swing district members also find it very difficult to avoid national political
issues. I describe this shift as US Style, and the new approach to congressional politics
ultimately shapes the incentives that govern Congress as an institution. Nationalization
also poses important practical political questions: what kind of a campaign should swing
district members run in a nationalized climate? How should they position take, credit
claim, and advertise? This thesis does not directly answer those questions, but they are
critical for swing district candidates, political consultants, and voters to think about.
Federalist 52 in the Federalist Papers outlines the structure of the US House of
Representatives. Either Hamilton or Madison wrote, “Frequent elections are
unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be
effectually secured.”271 Two-year election cycles ensured that representatives were
responsive to constituent needs. The Founders also knew that members of the House
would be more closely tied to their voters than senators, who held six-year terms and
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were elected by state legislators at the time.272 The two-year terms still exist, but the
political center for many House members does not lie only in their districts.
In the current 117th Congress, there are many examples of how representatives
have expanded their political calculus beyond Fenno’s four re-election categories. On
August 31st, 2021, Republican Clay Higgins of Louisiana traveled to DC and called on
President Joe Biden to step down while a serious tropical storm hit his district.273 Usually,
there can be significant political consequences for members if they are absent from their
district after a natural disaster. Instead of surveying the damage, Higgins made the
calculation that criticizing the Biden Administration would bring equal political benefits
as being present in the district. During the same recess period, representatives
Markwayne Mullin (R-OK), Seth Moulton (D-Mass.), and Peter Meijer (R-Mich.) went
to Kabul, Afghanistan to assist with American evacuations.274 Congressional recess is a
time for members to travel back to their districts and discuss their legislative
accomplishments; recess activities are examples of a home style re-election approach.
Those three members instead travelled to Afghanistan.
Fundraising also demonstrates how nationalized Congress has become. John
Fetterman, the current lieutenant governor of Pennsylvania and candidate for US Senate,
received donations from 50 percent of ZIP codes in the US.275 In 2020, Amy McGrath,
Democratic candidate for US Senate in Kentucky, raised a total $40.8 million for her bid
against Mitch McConnell.276 Nearly half of those contributions were from out-of-state
donors, mostly in New York and California.277 The national fundraising trend also applies
to the US House. First-term Republican member Madison Cawthorn from North
Carolina—who is also part of the conservative Freedom Caucus— raised $1.5 million
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between January 1st and June 30th, 2021. 278 Cawthorn spends much of the campaign
money on travel outside of his district, but is not a productive member in terms of
legislation: he has co-sponsored only one bill that became law.279 He also raises more
money than any other member from North Carolina, including veteran Republican
representatives Virginia Foxx and Patrick McHenry who both serve on the prestigious
financial services committee.280 Over half of Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s donations
during the 2018 cycle came from outside of New York, with most of the contributions
coming from Californians.281 The money that flows into these US House races is most
likely a function of both the digitization of fundraising platform and the nationalization of
politics.282 Nevertheless, national controversy can bring in financial support to members,
which will further incentivize many of them to embrace US Style.
What does the rise of US style mean for swing district members? It is a
complicated question. The two case studies in this thesis make clear that a nationalized
campaign can end political careers. Representative Sandlin’s vote against the Affordable
Care Act demonstrated that even position taking against one’s major policy priorities
cannot secure re-election. As nationalization only increases in this political environment,
it is difficult to see how many vulnerable members of Congress will be able to center
their campaigns mostly on local policy issues. Mayhew’s three re-election strategies and
the messages that they embrace will inevitably shift as a result. Former Speaker of the
House Tip O’Neill famously said, “All politics is local.”283 On election night in 2010,
Stephanie Herseth Sandlin, Harry Mitchell, and other Blue Dogs probably disagreed.
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